



International
Academy
Europe Faculty

Working with Europe and the EU – A New Context

3.2

Practitioner training for UK civil servants
organised by the European Institute of Public Administration
(EIPA), Maastricht on behalf of
the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)

London, 26-28 June 2023



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
Outline - afternoon session

- 1 Interactive exercise: Identifying your interlocutors - who is in charge of what in the EU's system of external action
- 2 (Open) strategic autonomy
- 3 Case study




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Group exercise: who does what?





The actors: who speaks for the EU?





Ursula von der Leyen
President of the European Commission





Charles Michel
President of the European Council

shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action...

shall be one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission,

Common Commercial Policy


Development

Migration

Humanitarian Assistance

Supranational - TFEU


shall 'conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy



Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Intergovernmental - TEU



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#EUstrivesformore #vdLcommission



A New Push for European Democracy



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Who speaks for the EU?



Who speaks for the EU?



G7: Who speaks for the EU?



The European External Action Service (EEAS)



The European External Action Service (EEAS)



... the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in **cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States** and shall comprise officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as **staff seconded from the diplomatic services of the Member States**.

(TEU Art. 27.3 + Declaration on Art. 27)

The result...

L 201/30

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

3.8.2010


DECISIONS

COUNCIL DECISION

of 26 July 2010

establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service

(2010/427/EU)



THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 27(3) thereof,


Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, in respect of his/her responsibilities within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the Commission services.

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the High Representative),

The European External Action Service (EEAS)

Management:

- at least 1/3 staff from MS
- at least 60% EU officials (COM/Council)
- 'adequate geographical and gender balance'
- 'meaningful presence' of nationals from all the MS



Towards an European Diplomacy?

... the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service **will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations ...**

Declaration 14 on CFSP, Lisbon Treaty

Borrell says he's not to blame for controversial EU statement on Venezuela

EU foreign policy chief faces criticism in Parliament for allegedly letting down opposition leader Juan Guaidó.



BY HANS VON DER BURCHARD
January 18, 2021 | 9:50 pm
f t in

Borrell told MEPs that it wasn't him but rather EU countries and the difficult procedures of the Council of the EU, where foreign policy decisions require unanimity, that were to blame for the phrasing.

"The text you are referring is not a statement [by myself] but ... a unanimous statement by the 27 EU member states," the former Spanish foreign minister told Parliament. "They are the ones who approved this communication which sets out the position of the Council."


The EEAS and the EU Delegations



Delegation of the European Union in Erevan, Armenia. 05.09.2018. [Shutterstock/Alexander Chizhenok]

The EEAS and the EU Delegations

Implementation of
'operational credits' in third
country
(sub-delegation by COM)



Outline - afternoon session

- 1 Interactive exercise: Identifying your interlocutors - who is in charge of what in the EU's system of external action
- 2 **(Open) strategic autonomy**
- 3 Case study

(Open) Strategic Autonomy

The Strategy nurtures the ambition of **strategic autonomy** for the European Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values.



An appropriate level of ambition and **strategic autonomy** is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders.

A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe's **strategic autonomy** and for a credible CSDP.



An appropriate level of ambition and **strategic autonomy** is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.

The “BPT factor”






DEFENDING EUROPE:
Improving Military Mobility in the European Union



"By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union."

President Juncker, State of the Union Address, September 2017

Creating a fully-fledged European Defence Union by 2025 is imperative to Europe's security and to build a **Union that protects**. A smooth, efficient and effective movement of military personnel and assets across and beyond the EU will enhance the EU's preparedness and response to crises. It will enable EU Member States to act faster, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, and in the framework of national and multinational activities. Currently, cross-border mobility is still hampered by a number of barriers that can lead to delays, disruption, higher costs or increased vulnerability.



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Towards a Defence Union ?

- 06/2016: EU Global Strategy (EUGS)
- 07/2016: EU-NATO Warsaw Joint Declaration
- 09/2016: Decision to set up Permanent Military Headquarters (MPCC)
- 11/2016: EUGS implementation plan on security and defence
- 11/2016: European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)
- 12/2016: Common set of 42 actions for the implementation of the EU-NATO joint Declaration
- 12/2016: Timetable implementation EDAP
- 05/2017: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)
- 06/2017: Launch European Defence Fund
- 12/2017: Launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation
- 03/2022: Adoption of the "Strategic Compass"
- 05/2023 Joint arms procurement for Ukraine under the European Peace Facility
- 2025 (tbc) Rapid deployment capacity of up to 5000 troops

Delivering on EU security and defence

EU Global strategy: Implementation plan on security and defence

- respond to external conflicts and crises
- build capacities of partners
- protect EU and its citizens

Proposed actions

- set capability development priorities
- deepen cooperation among member states
- adjust structures, tools and instruments
- take forward partnerships

EU-NATO joint declaration: implementation

**42 proposals
7 areas**

- hybrid threats
- operational cooperation, including maritime issues
- cyber security
- defence capabilities
- industry and research
- exercises
- capacity building

European defence action plan

European Commission proposal

- launch a European Defence Fund with
- a research window
- a capability window
- foster investments in defence supply chains
- strengthen the single market for defence

"The Commission is ready to engage at an unprecedented level in defence to support Member States. It will exploit the EU instruments, including EU funding, and the full potential of the Treaties, towards building a Defence Union."

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The EU's strategic compass

The EU is facing new and increasing threats and challenges. To counter them, protect its citizens, and enhance its strategic autonomy to become a stronger global partner, the EU needs to define what kind of security and defence actor it wants to be.

ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE EU'S SECURITY

As a first step to determine the direction of travel, the EU has conducted for the first time a comprehensive analysis on key threats and challenges to Europe, including:

- Global and regional threats
- Conflicts in our neighbourhood
- Challenges by state actors
- Threats by non-state actors

The Threat Analysis is a classified intelligence report identifying key trends:

- Global level:** slowdown of globalisation, growing economic rivalry between global powers, climate change and competition for resources, migratory pressures, and threats to the multilateral system.
- Regional level:** regional instability, conflict, state fragility, inter-state tensions, external influences, destabilising impact of non-state actors.
- Threats against the EU:** state and non-state actors targeting the EU with hybrid tools, including disruptive technologies, disinformation, and other non-military sources of influence; terrorist threat.

DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC COMPASS TO GUIDE OUR ACTIONS

The Strategic Compass will help strengthen a common European security and defence culture and help define the right objectives and concrete goals for our policies.

The Strategic Compass will address four different, inter-linked areas:

- Crisis management missions
- Resilience
- Capabilities and instruments
- Working with partners

JUNE 2020 Tasking by Council

1st HALF OF 2021 Strategic dialogue with Member States

EARLY 2022 Adoption of Strategic Compass

NOVEMBER 2020 Threat analysis

2nd HALF OF 2021 Development of Strategic Compass

A STRATEGIC COMPASS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE

For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security

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EU seals deal to send Ukraine 1M ammo rounds

The deal represents a landmark moment for the EU, which will be empowered to help negotiate arms contracts for the first time.



Ukrainian officials have said they need at least 1 million 155-millimeter shells to restock and maintain their defenses | Anatoli Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images

Strategic Autonomy (security & defence)


- Capacities ? Price tag?
- Strategic vision? Political will ?
- Questions of trust & leadership
- How to sell it to US,UK, Warsaw, Vilnius?



Figure 10

EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP AFTER FINLAND AND SWEDEN'S INTEGRATION

■ EU ■ EU & NATO ■ NATO



what about NATO?

what about NATO?

- 21(23) out of 27 EU countries are NATO Members
- Until end of 1990s virtually no relations/strict division of labour
- Cautious endorsement of CSDP by US in 1999

(The “3 Ds”: “no decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination”)

- “Berlin+” agreement (sharing of assets) 2003
- After 2004 EU enlargement: a “frozen conflict”



EU and NATO (2004-2016)



EU and NATO post-2016: a new spring ?





Strategic autonomy as an evolving concept

	Conventional perspective	Global perspective
Strategic autonomy for...	Security & Defence	Security & Defence, Trade & Industry, Digitalization, Climate, Health
Strategic autonomy from...	United States	United States, China, other emerging powers and economies
Strategic autonomy to...	Act militarily in Europe's neighbourhood, protect Europe	Promote European interests and values
Drivers	US structural pivot, transatlantic uncertainties	Rise of China and rivalry with US, technological change
Inter-organizational relations	NATO	NATO, UN, WTO
Alternative concepts	Strategic responsibility, ability to act	Open strategic autonomy (trade), European sovereignty (tech, industry)
Principal dividing lines	Threat perception & ties to the US	Political economy / Free market vs. state intervention

Source: FIIA Working Paper 119: EU strategic autonomy: A reality check for Europe's global agenda, Helsinki, 2020.

Updated 19:52, 22-Mar-2020

CGTN

Share      



Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic greeted Chinese doctors who arrived in Serbia on Saturday, kissing the Chinese flag in a show of gratitude for the country's timely support against COVID-19.

"The arrival of Chinese health professionals is of great importance to us because they were the first to defeat the great enemy of today: COVID-19," Vucic said.

IRJ
International Railway Journal
News Financial

Financial

February 6, 2019
Written by Keith Barrow

European Commission blocks Siemens-Alstom merger

THE European Commission (EC) announced on February 6 that it has blocked the merger of Siemens Mobility and Alstom on the grounds that the two companies have failed to address its concerns over the potential impact of the deal on competition in the signalling and high-speed rolling stock markets.



EU competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager

Siemens and Alstom confirmed immediately after the Commission's announcement that the merger will not go ahead.



From “strategic autonomy” towards “open strategic autonomy”

Tackle economic distortions	Defend against economic coercion	Link values and sustainability	Critical infrastructure & supply resilience
Trade Defence Instruments	Blocking Statute	CBAM	Investment Screening
Foreign Subsidy Instrument	INSTEX	Due Diligence	5G Toolbox
International Procurement Instrument	Anti-coercion Mechanism	Human Rights Sanctions	Export Controls
Enforcement Regulation	Financial Resilience		Supply Security
Chief Trade Enforcement Offer			Industrial Tools

Source: Tobias Gehrke: Threading the trade needle on open strategic autonomy, in: FIIA report 67, Strategic autonomy and the transformation of the EU: New agendas for security, diplomacy, trade and technology, Helsinki, 2021.

From “strategic autonomy” to “open strategic autonomy”

- Trade & Industry, Digitalization, Climate, Health...
- Focusing on “decreasing levels of reliance”
- Global interdependence: source of conflict or harmony?
- “open strategic autonomy” as best of two worlds?
- Risk of diluting the EU’s leverage on others?
- Do autonomy and formal sovereignty buy external leverage?

slido



What do you think which consequences are most likely to result from the EU striving towards strategic autonomy? (please rank – most likely above)

① Start presenting to display the poll results on this slide.




Case study: dealing with strategic partners

values and interests?

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The EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan (2006)

Priority area 1

Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Specific actions:

- Increase diplomatic efforts, including through the EUSR, and continue to support a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;

Priority area 2

Strengthen democracy in the country, including through fair and transparent electoral process, in line with international requirements

Priority area 3

Strengthen the protection of human rights and of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in compliance with international commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN)

The 2015 EU Country Report on Azerbaijan

There were welcome achievements in macroeconomic developments, the finalisation and publication of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) review and in the energy partnership with the EU, notably the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).

Nevertheless, these achievements were overshadowed by regression in most areas of deep and sustainable democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. As a result, Azerbaijan made very limited progress overall in implementing the ENP Action Plan. The frequency of political dialogue between the EU and Azerbaijan also decreased, and this had a knock-on effect on the formal human rights dialogue.

Partnership Priorities between the EU and Azerbaijan reinforce the bilateral agenda

11/07/2018



Today the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, marked the end of negotiations of the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership Priorities in the presence of President of the European

Council, Donald Tusk, and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev.

The Partnership Priorities represent an important step forward in EU-Azerbaijan relations, given that they set the joint policy priorities that will guide and enhance our partnership over the coming years. While also staying true to the principle of differentiation in the EU's relations with the countries in its eastern neighbourhood, the four main areas of cooperation under the Partnership Priorities reflect those identified under the Eastern Partnership framework, namely:

The EU-Azerbaijan partnership priorities (2018)

The Partnership Priorities represent an **important step forward** in EU-Azerbaijan relations (...) the four main areas of cooperation under the Partnership Priorities reflect those identified under the Eastern Partnership framework, namely:

- Strengthening institutions and good governance;
- Economic development and market opportunities;
- Connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate action;
- Mobility and people-to-people contacts;

Through the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Azerbaijan renew their commitment to an **ambitious and comprehensive agenda**

The 2019 Joint report on Azerbaijan

“The situation on human rights and fundamental freedoms remains challenging”.

“The country's relations with the EU were positive in 2018, as illustrated by the visit of President Aliyev to Brussels in July and the three visits of Foreign Minister Mamadyarov in February, May and July”

AZERBAIJAN, EU, CAUCASUS, TURKMENISTAN, TURKEY



Azerbaijan and EU agree to strategic energy partnership

The memorandum is a win for Baku while committing it to do little.

David O'Byrne Jul 18, 2022



European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev close the deal on July 18. (president.az)



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
EU to send 'civilian mission' to Armenia to help mark borders with Azerbaijan



Issued on: 07/10/2022 - 05:20



The different dimensions of EU External Action



Please evaluate!





Do You Have Any Questions?

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