

Working with Europe and the EU – A New Context

Practitioner training for UK civil servants
organised by the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA),
Maastricht on behalf of
the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)



Outline – morning session

- 1** EU external competences (interactive exercise)
- 2** From peace project to geo-political player
- 3** EU relations with third countries and their side effects on the UK
- 4** Beyond trade

Competences in EU external action


Exclusive competence: only the EU can act
Member States cannot act individually

Shared competence: Member States can act as long as EU has not acted

Parallel competence: Both EU and Member States can act


Intergovernmental policy: Transfer of competences is excluded. Member states can act within EU framework if decided by unanimity

Which policies fall under which competences? Drag and drop them to the right space.



3

The different dimensions of EU External Action



1	EU external competences (interactive exercise)
2	From peace project to geo-political player
3	EU relations with third countries and their side effects on the UK
4	Beyond trade

From peace project to geo-political player



Presidents Herman Van Rompuy, José Manuel Barroso and Martin Schulz receiving the Nobel Prize medal and diploma for the European Union (EU) during the Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony at the Oslo City Hall in Norway, 10 December 2012. Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 2012 Photo: Ken Opprann

The objectives of EU External Action

„In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.“

(TEU Art. 3(5))

The 2003 European Security Strategy

A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Brussels, 12 December 2003

Introduction



Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The EU Global Strategy (June 2016)


Foreword by Federica Mogherini


High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Vice-President of the European Commission




The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure.

Figure 1





EU : referee or player?



Principled Pragmatism

'The EU should remove its rose-tinted glasses and pragmatically look at the world as it is, not as it would like to see it.'

Nathalie Tocci, 2017



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Dealing with “systemic rivals”



Dealing with “systemic rivals”

Figure 4: China’s ‘ODA-like’ disbursements in ranking of DAC donors, 2019





Figure 5: China’s ‘ODA-like’ disbursements as % of GNI in ranking of DAC donors, 2019



Source: OECD CRS, ODA disbursements; Kitano, N. & Miyabayashi Y. 2020. Estimating China’s Foreign Aid: 2019-2020 Preliminary Figures’. Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, JICA. Figures based on OECD’s grant equivalent methodology, US\$ conversions based on current prices.



Norm makers and norm takers



EU slams China as 'systemic rival' as trade tension rises

Brussels also slaps down Italy for looking to engage too closely with Beijing.



POLITICO

Enter keyword

BY HANS VON DER BURCHARD
March 12, 2022 | 7:58 pm
f t in

Europe dramatically sharpened its political stance against China on Tuesday by slamming Beijing as a "systemic rival" for the first time.

In a strategic communication mapping out 10 proposals for dealing with Beijing, the European Commission also slapped down

Dealing with "Systemic Rivals"



NEWS

Home | Queen Elizabeth II | War in Ukraine | Coronavirus | Climate | Video | World | UK | Business | Tech | Science

World | Africa | Asia | Australia | Europe | Latin America | Middle East | US & Canada

EU awards Ukraine and Moldova candidate status

By Jessica Parker, Joe Inwood & Steve Rosenberg
In Brussels, Kyiv and Moscow

23 June

Russia-Ukraine war



Today's the day to declare Ukraine x +

https://euobserver.com/opinion/154406

SECTION / OPINION

OPINION

Today's the day to declare Ukraine an EU candidate country

Kyiv in the winter - could it become a member state capital? (Photo: Mariusz Kluzniak)

By **WOLFGANG KOETH**
MAASTRICHT, 22. FEB. 11:46

- HEADLINE NEWS
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- CORRECTIONS

EU to officially examine Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia's bids to join the bloc

While the move is just a technical step, it still carries significant symbolic value.



The prime ministers of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia at the European Commission on November 30, 2021 | Pool photo by Stephanie Lecocq/EPA-EFE



BY JACOPO BARRIGAZZI
March 7, 2022 | 7:23 pm

EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine (packages)

Info retrieved from: [Timeline - EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine - Georgia \(levopsa.eu\)](#)

*sanction targeted only for Belarus

Regulation	Reference	Field
1st package 23/02/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/259	269/2014	- Asset freezes and travel restrictions (1 473 individuals and 205 entities)
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/260	269/2014	- Economic sanctions targeting the financial, trade, energy, transport, technology and defence sectors (SWIFT ban, closure of EU airspace and ports, price cap of crude oil and petroleum...)
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/261	269/2014	- Restrictions on media
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/262	833/2014	- Visa measures (suspension of visa facilitation EU-Russia agreement and for diplomats and businesspeople)
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/263	No reference	EU adopts package of sanctions in response to Russian recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and sending of troops into the region
- Sanctions related to aviation and finance		
- Transactions prohibited with the Russian Central Bank		
2nd package 25/02/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2023/426	269/2014	- Freezing assets on the members of National Security Council, extended to the members of Duma.
Council Regulation (EU) 2023/427	833/2014	- Economic sanctions targeting financial, energy, transport and technology.
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/429	2017/1770	- Visa policy Russia's military aggression against Ukraine: EU imposes sanctions against President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and adopts wide ranging individual and economic sanctions
3rd package 28/02/2022 and 02/03/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/334	833/2014	- Sanctions related to aviation and finance
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/345	833/2014	- Transactions prohibited with the Russian Central Bank
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350	833/2014	- € 500 million support package to finance equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces - A ban on investing to projects on Russian Direct Investment Fund and selling euro banknotes to Russia - suspension of broadcasting of Russia Today and Sputnik - excluding seven Russian banks from SWIFT EU adjusts the set of measures to respond to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine
4th package 15/03/2022		
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427	269/2014	- Ban on all transactions with certain state-owned enterprises, the provision of credit rating to any Russian, new investments in Russian energy sector
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428	833/2014	- Trade restrictions for iron, steel and luxury goods - Sanctions on a additional 15 individual and 9 entities Fourth package of sanctions in view of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine: 15 additional individuals and 9 entities subject to EU restrictive measures
5th package 08/04/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/576	833/2014	- Ban on imports of coal, accessing EU ports, road transport, imports of other goods, exports to Russia of jet fuel, deposits of crypto-wallets
Council Regulation (EU)	269/2014	

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/581	269/2014	EU adopts fifth round of sanctions against Russia over its military aggression against Ukraine
6th package 03/06/2022		
*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876	765/2006	- a ban on imports from Russia of crude oil and refined petroleum products
*Council Regulation (EU) 2022/877	765/2006	- a SWIFT ban for an additional three Russian bank and one Belarusian bank
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878	269/2014	- suspension of broadcasting in the EU for three more Russian state-owned outlets
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879	833/2014	- sanctions against an additional 65 individuals and 18 entities Russia's aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts sixth package of sanctions
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/880	269/2014	
7th package 21/07/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1269	833/2014	- prohibition to purchase, import or transfer Russian-origin gold
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1270	269/2014	- reinforces export controls of dual use goods - extends the existing port access ban to locks - clarifies existing measures - sanctions an additional 54 individuals and 10 entities Russia's aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts "maintenance and alignment" package
8th package 06/10/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1903	2022/263	- a price cap related to the maritime transport of Russian oil for three countries
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904	833/2014	- additions to the list of restricted items which may contribute to Russia's military and technological enhancement
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1905	269/2014	- additional restrictions on trade and services with Russia - an additional 30 individuals and 7 entities
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1906	269/2014	EU adopts its latest package of sanctions against Russia over the illegal annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions
9th package 16/12/2022		
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474	833/2014	Bans on: - exports of drone engines
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2475	269/2014	- exports of dual-use goods and technology
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2476	269/2014	- investments in the mining sector - transactions with the Russian Regional Development Bank - the provision of advertising, market research and public opinion polling services Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts 9th package of economic and individual sanctions
10th package 25/02/2023		
Council Regulation (EU) 2023/426	269/2014	Bans on: - exports of critical technology and industrial goods
Council Regulation (EU) 2023/427	833/2014	- imports of asphalt and synthetic rubber - provision of gas storage capacity to Russians
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/429	269/2014	- transit through Russia of EU exported dual use goods and technology - suspended the broadcasting licenses of RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic - restricted the possibility for Russian nationals to hold any position in the governing bodies of EU critical infrastructures and entities - introduced new reporting obligations to ensure the effectiveness of the asset freeze prohibitions



EU seals deal to send Ukraine 1M ammo rounds


The deal represents a landmark moment for the EU, which will be empowered to help negotiate arms contracts for the first time.



Ukrainian officials have said they need at least 1 million 155-millimeter shells to restock and maintain their defenses | Anatoli Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images



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THE GLOBAL GATEWAY

Connecting goods, people and services around the world in a sustainable way

€ 300 billion in investments (2021-2027) Through a **Team Europe** approach

Global Gateway is Europe's offer to build more resilient connections with the world through investments and partnerships

INVESTMENT PRIORITIES

- Digital Networks and Infrastructures
- Climate Resilience and Clean Energy
- Green Smart and Safe Transport
- Health Systems and Supply Chains
- High Quality Education and Research

KEY GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTMENTS

- Democratic values and high standards
- Good governance and transparency
- Equal partnerships
- Catalysing private sector investment
- Security focused
- Green and clean infrastructures

[Download](#)

What does the future hold?



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Over the next decade, what would you consider the biggest foreign policy challenge to the UK? (please rank - highest above)

① Start presenting to display the poll results on this slide.

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


In which part of the world do you see the biggest opportunities for a joint approach between the UK and the EU? (please rank - biggest opportunities above)

① Start presenting to display the poll results on this slide.

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The Neighbours



EU – China relations

- Relations EEC - PRC established in 1975
 - 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement
 - Trade volume multiplied by 10 since 1989 (EUR 180bn in 2020), both sides now each others biggest trading partners
 - After 2008: changing attitudes in Beijing towards market liberalisation
 - 2019: “**negotiation partner, economic competitor systemic rival**”
 - 2020: Bilateral Investment Agreement (CAI) (ratification frozen by EP)
- China biggest policy driver behind EU Trade policy!




EU – Russia relations

- No formal relations EEC-USSR
- 1994: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
- 2004: EU “Eastern” Enlargement / Russia rejects invitation to ENP
- 2007: Russia turning its back on EU, West
- 2008: Military intervention in Georgia
- 2014: Russian aggression of Ukraine I : End of European Security Order
- 2022: Russian aggression of Ukraine II: End of illusions



Did the war in Ukraine come as a shock to your country?

- Yes. We heard the warnings of US intelligence, but we still did not think Russia would embark on such a large-scale war. (17)
- We have always known that Putin's Russia has not abandoned its imperial ambitions and will seek to subjugate its neighbours if it sees a chance. (5)
- We have long thought the stalemate in Donbas might lead to another war. (3)
- We did not expect it otherwise, but the intelligence shared by the US convinced us. (2)



EU – US relations

- Relationship based much on historic ties
- Post WWII: US support for European security and reconstruction (Marshall Plan), pushing Europeans towards integration
- EU off US strategic radar after 1991
- Biggest trading partner (until 2020)
- Two failed attempts to conclude FTAs (TAFTA and TTIP)
- New impetus under Biden (TCC), but dividing issues persist (and are even growing...)
- Revival of transatlantic security alliance after Russian aggression




EU – Turkey relations

- Association agreement with EEC (1963)
- Customs Union 1995 (EU FTA impact!)
- Application to join the EEC 1987
- Candidate Country 1999
- Start of accession negotiations 2005
- EU Turkey deal 2016 – “principled pragmatism”
- Standstill of relations after July 2016 putsch attempt



The EU in a multilateral context

- UN: EU not a “peace loving nation”; enhanced observer status at GA with enhanced participation rights
- Different membership status in UN agencies (full member of FAO; simple observer at ECOSOC)



Source: EPRS

The EU in a multilateral context

- UN: EU not a “peace loving nation”; enhanced observer status at GA with enhanced participation rights
- Different membership status in UN agencies (full member of FAO; simple observer at ECOSOC and specialized agencies)
- Full member of WTO; speaks on behalf of MS
- Simple observer at WHO (competences...)
- World Bank/IMF: no formal status, but financial framework partnership agreements
- Key challenge: coordination of MS positions

1	EU external competences (interactive exercise)
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Beyond trade



TITLE II COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY


Article 206 (ex Article 131 TEC)

By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers.

Article 207 (ex Article 133 TEC)

1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action.

The EU's share in world trade (pre-2020)




Note: the figure shows developments for the top six countries/geographic aggregates with the highest combined values of exports and imports in 2017. The total value of exports and imports for the world excludes intra-EU trade. United Arab Emirates: not available.
(*) Extra-EU trade.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: bop_eu6_q) and International Monetary Fund (Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics)

eurostat

The EU's share in world trade

Imports, exports and trade balance by country, 2020
(EUR billion)




Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_it_introeu27_2020) and UNCTAD

eurostat




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Size matters!



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The “Brussels effect”



Exporting norms (and values?) through Free Trade Agreements?




EU Free Trade Agreements: what's in them?

- Tariffs / Quotas / Rules of Origin
- Non-Tariff Barriers / Technical Barriers to Trade / "Behind the Border" Issues / Regulatory issues
 - **Sanitary and phytosanitary issues**
 - **Intellectual property** (geographical denominations)
 - Public procurement
 - Investment & Investment protection
 - Competition
 - Commercial instruments
 - Energy and raw materials
 - Environment & Labor rights

TBTs, NTMs, "behind-the border issues"

- Governments rely on **Non-Tariff Measures** to achieve public policy goals, including the protection of human health and the environment
- Regulators and law-makers translate collective preferences into binding rules
- Trade is affected is a normal and legitimate consequence of such regulation.
- But NTMs can be used to shield domestic producers from foreign competitors



Regulatory cooperation in EU FTAs

- Impact on citizens / consumers
- undermining democratic processes?
- The “Right to regulate”
- Actual undermining of legitimate social and environmental objectives?
- Race to the bottom?



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Norm makers and norm takers

Quiz: In which EU agreement can we find these provisions?

- A) TCA
- B) EU-Ukraine DCFTA
- C) EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)



6. If a Party considers that a subsidy⁶ granted by the other Party has or could have a negative effect on its investment interests under this Agreement, the former Party may express its concern in written form to the other Party, indicating how the subsidy has or could have such negative effect, and request consultations on the matter. The Parties shall enter into consultations with a view to resolving the matter.
7. If the requesting Party, after the consultations have been held, considers that the subsidy concerned has or could have a significant negative effect on the requesting Party's investment interests under this Agreement, the requested Party shall use its best endeavours to find a solution with the requesting Party. Any solution must be considered feasible and acceptable by both Parties.

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Norm makers and norm takers



Quiz: In which EU agreement can we find these provisions?

- A) TCA
- B) EU-Ukraine DCFTA
- C) EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)

1. The Parties may engage in regulatory cooperation activities on a voluntary basis, without prejudice to the autonomy of their own decision-making and their respective legal orders. A Party may refuse to engage in or it may withdraw from regulatory cooperation activities. A Party that refuses to engage in or that withdraws from regulatory cooperation activities should explain the reasons for its decision to the other Party.

Norm makers and norm takers



Quiz: In which EU agreement can we find these provisions?

- A) TCA
- B) EU-Ukraine DCFTA
- C) EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)


Article 114

Regulatory approximation

1. The Parties recognise the importance of the approximation of [redacted]s existing legislation to that of the European Union. [redacted] shall ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will be gradually made compatible with the EU *acquis*.
2. Such approximation will start on the date of signing of this Agreement, and will gradually extend to all the elements of the EU *acquis* referred to in Annex XVII to this Agreement.

Norm makers and norm takers

Case study : Geographical indications



Norm makers and norm takers

Case study : Geographical indications

Home > Food, Farming, Fisheries > Food safety and quality > Certification > Quality labels > Geographical Indications register

eAmbrosia

the EU geographical indications register



eAmbrosia is a legal register of the names of agricultural products and foodstuffs, wine, aromatised wine products and spirit drinks that are registered and protected across the EU.

It provides a direct access to information on all registered geographical indications, including the legal instruments of protection and product specifications. It also displays key dates and links for applications and publications before the geographical indications are registered.

You can also find information about the traditional terms for wine and the traditional specialities guaranteed in the section Related links below.

- Wine register
- Food register
- Spirit drinks register
- Aromatised wine register

Norm makers and norm takers

Case study : Geographical indications

11.5.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 122/67

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 449/2011

of 6 May 2011

entering certain names in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (陕西苹果 (Shaanxi ping guo) (PDO), 龙井茶 (Longjing Cha) (PDO), 琚溪蜜柚 (Guanxi Mi You) (PDO), 蠡县麻山药 (Lixian Ma Shan Yao) (PGI))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and

(2) As no statement of objection under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 has been received by the Commission, these names should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:



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Norm makers and norm takers

Case study : Geographical indications

Geographical Indications Identifying a Product Originating in the European Union

Indication	Transliteration (for information purposes only)	Product Class	Place of Origin (Territory, Region or Locality)	
Ceské pivo		beer	Czech Republic	
Zatecký Chmel		hops	Czech Republic	
Hopfen aus der Hallertau		hops	Germany	
Nürnberger Bratwürste**		fresh, frozen meats	Germany	
Nürnberger Rostbratwürste		fresh, frozen meats	Germany	
Schwarzwälder Schinken		fresh, frozen meats	Germany	
		Spreewälder Gurken	fresh and processed vegetable products	Germany
		Danablu	cheeses	Denmark
		Ελιά Καλαμάτας	table and processed olives	Greece
		Μαστίχα Χίου	natural gums and resins — chewing gum	Greece
		Φέτα*	cheeses	Greece



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FROM POLITICO PRO

Halloumi cheese puts EU's Canada trade deal to the test

Cypriot vote against Canada accord will test whether EU countries' parliaments can torpedo big deals.




BY BARBARA MOENS, GIORGIO LEALI AND ELEANOR MEARS
August 4, 2020 | 4:46 pm




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The Instruments of the Common Commercial Policy



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From liberalisation towards enforcement and protection



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Compared to the EU, the conclusion of bilateral Free Trade Agreements is for the UK...

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
What is the biggest advantage the UK has over the EU, when it comes to concluding bilateral Free Trade Agreements with third countries?

① Start presenting to display the poll results on this slide.

Outline - afternoon session



- 1 Interactive exercise: Identifying your interlocutors - who is in charge of what in the EU's system of external action
- 2 (Open) strategic autonomy
- 3 EU development policy

Group exercise: who does what?



The actors: who speaks for the EU?







Who speaks for the EU?



G7: Who speaks for the EU?



The European External Action Service (EEAS)



The European External Action Service (EEAS)



... the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in **cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States** and shall comprise officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as **staff seconded from the diplomatic services of the Member States**.

(TEU Art. 27.3 + Declaration on Art. 27)

The result...

L 201/30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.8.2010

DECISIONS

COUNCIL DECISION
of 26 July 2010

establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service

(2010/427/EU)



THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 27(3) thereof,


Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the High Representative),

Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, in respect of his/her responsibilities within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the Commission services.

The European External Action Service (EEAS)

Management:

- at least 1/3 staff from MS
- at least 60% EU officials (COM/Council)
- 'adequate geographical and gender balance'
- 'meaningful presence' of nationals from all the MS



Towards an European Diplomacy?

... the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service **will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations ...**

Declaration 14 on CFSP, Lisbon Treaty

Borrell says he's not to blame for controversial EU statement on Venezuela

EU foreign policy chief faces criticism in Parliament for allegedly letting down opposition leader Juan Guaidó.



BY HANS VON DER BURCHARD
January 16, 2021 11:50 am
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Borrell told MEPs that it wasn't him but rather EU countries and the difficult procedures of the Council of the EU, where foreign policy decisions require unanimity, that were to blame for the phrasing.

"The text you are referring is not a statement [by myself] but ... a unanimous statement by the 27 EU member states," the former Spanish foreign minister told Parliament. "They are the ones who approved this communication which sets out the position of the Council."



The EEAS and the EU Delegations




Delegation of the European Union in Erevan, Armenia. 05.09.2018. [Shutterstock/Alexander Chizhenok]



The EEAS and the EU Delegations

Implementation of
'operational credits' in third
country
(sub-delegation by COM)



Outline - afternoon session

- 1 Interactive exercise: Identifying your interlocutors - who is in charge of what in the EU's system of external action
- 2 **(Open) strategic autonomy**
- 3 EU development policy

(Open) Strategic Autonomy

The Strategy nurtures the ambition of **strategic autonomy** for the European Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values.

An appropriate level of ambition and **strategic autonomy** is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders.

A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe's **strategic autonomy** and for a credible CSDP.



An appropriate level of ambition and **strategic autonomy** is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.



The “BPT factor”



Strategic Autonomy (security & defence)

- Capacities ? Price tag?
- Strategic vision? Political will ?
- Questions of trust & leadership
- How to sell it to US,UK, Warsaw, Vilnius?



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European
Commission



#EUdefence

DEFENDING EUROPE:

Improving Military Mobility in the European Union



"By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union."

President Juncker, State of the Union Address, September 2017

Creating a fully-fledged European Defence Union by 2025 is imperative to Europe's security and to build a **Union that protects**. A smooth, efficient and effective movement of military personnel and assets across and beyond the EU will enhance the EU's preparedness and response to crises. It will enable EU Member States to act faster, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, and in the framework of national and multinational activities. Currently, cross-border mobility is still hampered by a number of barriers that can lead to delays, disruption, higher costs or increased vulnerability.

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Towards a Defence Union ?

06/2016: EU Global Strategy (EUGS)

07/2016: EU-NATO Warsaw Joint Declaration

09/2016: Decision to set up Permanent Military Headquarters (MPCC)

11/2016: EUGS implementation plan on security and defence

11/2016: European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)

12/2016: Common set of 42 actions for the implementation of the EU-NATO joint Declaration

12/2016: Timetable implementation EDAP

05/2017: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

06/2017: Launch European Defence Fund

12/2017: Launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation

21/03/2022: Adoption of the "Strategic Compass"



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"The Commission is ready to engage at an unprecedented level in defence to support Member States. It will exploit the EU instruments, including EU funding, and the full potential of the Treaties, towards building a Defence Union".



The EU's strategic compass

The EU is facing new and increasing threats and challenges. To counter them, protect its citizens, and enhance its strategic autonomy to become a stronger global partner, the EU needs to define what kind of security and defence actor it wants to be.

ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE EU'S SECURITY

As a first step to determine the direction of travel, the EU has conducted for the first time a comprehensive analysis on key threats and challenges to Europe, including:

Global and regional threats

Conflicts in our neighbourhood

Challenges by state actors

Threats by non-state actors

The Threat Analysis is a classified intelligence report identifying key trends:

- Global level:** slowdown of globalisation, growing economic rivalry between global powers, climate change and competition for resources, migratory pressures, and threats to the multilateral system.
- Regional level:** regional instability, conflict, state fragility, inter-state tensions, external influences, destabilising impact of non-state actors.
- Threats against the EU:** state and non-state actors targeting the EU with hybrid tools, including disruptive technologies, disinformation, and other non-military sources of influence; terrorist threat.

DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC COMPASS TO GUIDE OUR ACTIONS

The Strategic Compass will help strengthen a common European security and defence culture and help define the right objectives and concrete goals for our policies.

The Strategic Compass will address four different, inter-linked areas:

Crisis management missions

Resilience

Capabilities and Instruments

Working with partners

JUNE 2020

Tasking by Council

1st HALF OF 2021

Strategic dialogue with Member States

EARLY 2022

Adoption of Strategic Compass

NOVEMBER 2020

Threat analysis

2nd HALF OF 2021

Development of Strategic Compass

A STRATEGIC COMPASS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE

For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security

Figure 30

EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP AFTER FINLAND AND SWEDEN'S INTEGRATION

■ EU ■ EU & NATO ■ NATO

EIPA | European Institute of Public Administration

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what about NATO?

- 21 out of 27 EU countries are NATO Members
- Until end of 1990s virtually no relations/strict division of labour
- Cautious endorsement of CSDP by US in 1999
(The “3 Ds”: “no decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination”)
- “Berlin+” agreement (sharing of assets) 2003
- After 2004 EU enlargement: a “frozen conflict”



EU and NATO (2004-2016)



EU and NATO post-2016: a new spring ?



Strategic autonomy as an evolving concept

	Conventional perspective	Global perspective
Strategic autonomy for...	Security & Defence	Security & Defence, Trade & Industry, Digitalization, Climate, Health
Strategic autonomy from...	United States	United States, China, other emerging powers and economies
Strategic autonomy to...	Act militarily in Europe's neighbourhood, protect Europe	Promote European interests and values
Drivers	US structural pivot, transatlantic uncertainties	Rise of China and rivalry with US, technological change
Inter-organizational relations	NATO	NATO, UN, WTO
Alternative concepts	Strategic responsibility, ability to act	Open strategic autonomy (trade), European sovereignty (tech, industry)
Principal dividing lines	Threat perception & ties to the US	Political economy / Free market vs. state intervention

Source: FIIA Working Paper 119: EU strategic autonomy: A reality check for Europe's global agenda, Helsinki, 2020.

Updated 19:52, 22-Mar-2020

CGTN

Share      



Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic greeted Chinese doctors who arrived in Serbia on Saturday, kissing the Chinese flag in a show of gratitude for the country's timely support against COVID-19.

"The arrival of Chinese health professionals is of great importance to us because they were the first to defeat the great enemy of today: COVID-19," Vucic said.



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From “strategic autonomy” to “open strategic autonomy”

- Trade & Industry, Digitalization, Climate, Health...
- Focusing on “decreasing levels of reliance”
- Global interdependence: source of conflict or harmony?
- “open strategic autonomy” as best of two worlds?
- Risk of diluting the EU’s leverage on others?
- Do autonomy and formal sovereignty buy external leverage?

From “strategic autonomy” towards “open strategic autonomy”

Tackle economic distortions	Defend against economic coercion	Link values and sustainability	Critical infrastructure & supply resilience
Trade Defence Instruments	Blocking Statute	CBAM	Investment Screening
Foreign Subsidy Instrument	INSTEX	Due Diligence	5G Toolbox
International Procurement Instrument	Anti-coercion Mechanism	Human Rights Sanctions	Export Controls
Enforcement Regulation	Financial Resilience		Supply Security
Chief Trade Enforcement Offer			Industrial Tools

Source: Tobias Gehrke: Threading the trade needle on open strategic autonomy, in :FIIA report 67, Strategic autonomy and the transformation of the EU: New agendas for security, diplomacy, trade and technology, Helsinki, 2021.

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
What do you think which consequences are most likely to result from the EU striving towards strategic autonomy? (please rank – most likely above)

① Start presenting to display the poll results on this slide.



Case study: dealing with strategic partners

values and interests?



The EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan (2006)

<p>Priority area 1</p> <p><i>Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict</i></p> <p>Specific actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase diplomatic efforts, including through the EUSR, and continue to support a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;
<p>Priority area 2</p> <p><i>Strengthen democracy in the country, including through fair and transparent electoral process, in line with international requirements</i></p>
<p>Priority area 3</p> <p><i>Strengthen the protection of human rights and of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in compliance with international commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN)</i></p>



The 2015 EU Country Report on Azerbaijan

There were welcome achievements in macroeconomic developments, the finalisation and publication of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) review and in the energy partnership with the EU, notably the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).

Nevertheless, these achievements were overshadowed by regression in most areas of deep and sustainable democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. As a result, Azerbaijan made very limited progress overall in implementing the ENP Action Plan. The frequency of political dialogue between the EU and Azerbaijan also decreased, and this had a knock-on effect on the formal human rights dialogue.



Partnership Priorities between the EU and Azerbaijan reinforce the bilateral agenda

11/07/2018



Today the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, marked the end of negotiations of the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership Priorities in the presence of President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev.

The Partnership Priorities represent an important step forward in EU-Azerbaijan relations, given that they set the joint policy priorities that will guide and enhance our partnership over the coming years. While also staying true to the principle of differentiation in the EU's relations with the countries in its eastern neighbourhood, the four main areas of cooperation under the Partnership Priorities reflect those identified under the Eastern Partnership framework, namely:



The EU-Azerbaijan partnership priorities (2018)

The Partnership Priorities represent an **important step forward** in EU-Azerbaijan relations (...) the four main areas of cooperation under the Partnership Priorities reflect those identified under the Eastern Partnership framework, namely:

- Strengthening institutions and good governance;
- Economic development and market opportunities;
- Connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate action;
- Mobility and people-to-people contacts;

Through the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Azerbaijan renew their commitment to an **ambitious and comprehensive agenda**



The 2019 Joint report on Azerbaijan

“The situation on human rights and fundamental freedoms remains challenging”.

“The country's relations with the EU were positive in 2018, as illustrated by the visit of President Aliyev to Brussels in July and the three visits of Foreign Minister Mamadyarov in February, May and July”

JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Report on EU - Azerbaijan relations in the framework of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy



AZERBAIJAN, EU, CAUCASUS, TURKMENISTAN, TURKEY



Azerbaijan and EU agree to strategic energy partnership

The memorandum is a win for Baku while committing it to do little.

David O'Byrne Jul 18, 2022



European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev close the deal on July 18. (president.az)



Europe


EU to send 'civilian mission' to Armenia to help mark borders with Azerbaijan




Issued on: 07/10/2022 - 05:20



The different dimensions of EU External Action



Please evaluate!



**Do You Have
Any Questions?**

w.koeth@eipa.eu



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